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NOTE AND COMMENT
THn ScoPZ oP 'rX MANN A.-As was to be expected in view of the
well-settled doctrine of the Supreme Court that the constitutional grant
of power to regulate interstate commerce includes power of control over
transportation of persons as well as property, it was held in Hoke v. United
States, 227 U. S. 308, 57 L. Ed. 523, 33 Sup. Ct. 281, that the WHITZ
SrAvz TRArric ActY of i9io (36 Stat. 825), usually referred to as the MANN
AcT, was constitutional. State legislation covering the same ground, it
has been held, has been displaced. State v. Harper, 48 Mont. 456,138 Pac. 495.
Wide differences as to the interpretation of the ACT early arose. That
commercialized vice was intended to be reached was indicated by the name
given to the AcT by Congress itself and by the report accompanying the
introduction of the AcT into the House of Representatives. This view seems
to have been adopted by Judge PoLocx in the United States District Court
in an unreported case. See 12 MIcH. L. Rxv. i56. The terms of the AcT,
however, quite clearly do not so limit its operation. By §2 it is provided
"That any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported
** * in interstate or foreign commerce *** any woman or girl for the
purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose
* * * shall be -deemed guilty of a felony," etc. In three cases attracting
wide attention it was held that the offense was committed by transportation
of a woman in interstate commerce simply for the gratification of personal
desire and pleasure, no phase of commercialized vice being present. Johnson
v. United States, 215 Fed. 679, 131 C. C. A. 613; Diggs v. United States,
and Caminetti v. United States, 22o Fed. 545. The latter cases have been
recently affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice and Justices
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McK N A and CLAnim, however, dissenting. Caminetti, et al. v. United States,
37 Sup. Ct. 192.
Speaking of the interpretation of written law BLAcnSTONZ says, "As to
the effects and consequence, the rule is, that where words bear either none,
or a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little
deviate from the received sense of them. Therefore the Bolognian law,
mentioned by PuEZNDORr, which enacted 'that whoever drew blood in the
streets should be punished with the utmost severity,' was held after long
debate 'not to extend to the surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that
fell down in the street with a fit." i BLAcK. CoMm. *6o. "The same com-
mon sense accepts the ruling, cited by PvowazN, that the statute of First
Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty
of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison
is on fire; 'for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.'
And we think that a like common sense will sanction the ruling we make,
that the Act of Congress which punishes the obstruction or retarding of the
passage of the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply to a case of temporary
detention of the mail caused by the arrest of the cirrier upon an indictment
for murder." United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486. And in Church of
The Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, it was held that the im-
portation by the accused of an alien under contract to serve as rector of
a church was not punishable under a statute making it an offense to import
aliens "under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States,"
it being conceded that the act upon which the prosecution was based was
clearly included within the language of the statute. The dissenting Justices
in the principal case, being of opinion both from external and internal evi-
dences that the legislative purpose was to cover only commercialized vice,
sought to apply the principle of these holdings. The complete blameless-
ness of the physician, of the officer making the arrest of the mail carrier,
and of the church, in the instances referred to would seem to make out
a situation differing vitally from that of the defendant who has transported
a woman in interstate commerce for the purpose of fornication or adultery.
To the argument that under the interpretation of the AcT adopted by the
Supreme Court opportunities for blackmail may be vastly increased, it may
perhaps be suggested that even so the wholly innocent traveller has nothing
to fear. If a man in his peregrinations chooses to provide himself with
female society to while away the tedious hours of travel it is not entirely
unreasonable to expect him to assume such risks, even granting that re-
lations between him and his companion may never actually have passed
beyond the purely platonic. R. W. A.
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